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developed (“Annex I”) and developing (“non-Annex I”) 
countries in terms of their mitigation commitments, 
and marked a paradigm change from the Kyoto-Pro-
tocol-style top-down mandatory absolute emission 
reduction targets to a more bottom-up system of 
voluntary pledges of diverse types. 
Climate finance has remained a crucial component of 
the agreement. It is important in diplomatic terms 
as a way to gain support and trust from developing 
countries, and in substantial terms as a key means 
for delivering the needed mitigation and adaptation 
in developing countries.
While Parties did reach an Agreement in Paris, many 
questions around climate finance still remain open: 
How much finance is to be provided? What should 
count as climate finance? Who should provide how 
much? How should climate finance be distributed? 
How can we measure and verify climate finance 
flows? And who is to decide on these issues?  
These questions are contested, and they are not new. 
Here, we discuss where the Paris Summit has moved 
forward – if it did move forward at all. We thereby 
focus on three central issues: the overall volume of 
climate finance, its sources and its distribution. 
A short history of climate finance
The provision of funding from developed to develop-
ing countries has been a central element of the cli-
In December 2015, almost 150 heads of state and 
government gathered in Paris to open the talks that 
were to deliver a new climate change agreement. 
After repeated failures to reach a deal that would 
satisfy all countries’ expectations on how to pre-
vent dangerous climate change, hopes on the Paris 
Agreement were high but also cautious. According to 
most media coverage, the meeting’s outcome widely 
exceeded expectations and offers a new chance to 
successfully address one of the most complex mul-
tilateral cooperation problems of our times. Paris 
was undoubtedly an example of the best multilateral 
diplomacy, where the host achieved to maintain full 
legitimacy and transparency and trust in its leader-
ship. In substantial terms, it managed to break the 
over 20-year old strict separation of the world into 
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mate change negotiations since their inception. Yet, 
for a long time, negotiation texts and outcomes did 
not specify the required level of funding. The 1992 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), recognizing the “common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capa-
bilities” of states, stipulated that developed countries 
“provide new and additional financial resources” to 
assist developing countries in meeting their obliga-
tions under the Convention as well as in adapting to 
climate impacts. Yet funding was not readily forth-
coming. Acknowledging that the levels of finance 
provided were insufficient, Parties set up three mul-
tilateral funds at the Conference of Parties (COP) in 
Marrakesh (2001): the Special Climate Change Fund, 
the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Adapta-
tion Fund. Climate finance overall continued to be 
sparse and filling these funds a challenge, although 
the latter receives a share of the proceeds from the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM 
is one of the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol (1997); it allows developed countries to fund 
mitigation measures in developing countries and 
count emission reductions thus achieved toward their 
own commitments. A 2% levy raised on the CDM’s 
proceeds is used to fund the mechanism’s adminis-
tration and the Adaptation Fund. 
Only in the most recent round of negotiations, start-
ing with COP 13 in Bali (2007), did climate finance 
take centre-stage. While the 2009 Copenhagen Sum-
mit is widely seen as a failure, it marked a break-
through on climate finance as specific numbers were 
brought up for the first time. In an effort to salvage 
the Summit, developed countries promised “scaled-
up, new and additional, predictable and adequate 
funding”. Specifically, in the Copenhagen Accord 
they pledged 30 billion USD in so-called “Fast-Start 
Finance” for the period from 2010 through 2012 as 
well as committed to “a goal of mobilizing jointly 
USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020”. This target 
was confirmed and formalized in Cancún the follow-
ing year, and has been high on the agenda since then. 
A significant part of this funding should flow through 
the newly established Green Climate Fund, a new 
multilateral financial mechanism under the UNFCCC 
to assist developing countries with mitigation and 
adaptation while encouraging national ownership of 
the funded projects and programmes. 
How much climate finance?
Since the Copenhagen Accord, the USD 100 billion 
target has become the “gold standard” of climate 
finance, the point of reference of any pledge. At 
Paris, Parties reiterated the USD 100 billion tar-
get as it was crucial to get developing countries on 
board. The decision that accompanied the Paris 
Agreement – of less weight than the Agreement 
text itself – extends this target up to the year 2025 
and calls for a new collective quantitative target 
of at least USD 100 billion from 2025 onwards, to 
be agreed by 2025. At the same time it “strongly 
urges developed country Parties to scale up their 
level of financial support, with a concrete roadmap 
to achieve the goal of jointly providing USD 100 
billion annually by 2020 for mitigation and adapta-
tion while significantly increasing adaptation finance 
from current levels”. Germany was the first of a 
group of developed countries announcing scaled-up 
climate finance in the run up to Paris, and pledged 
to double it to EUR 4 billion until 2020. The graph 
on page one shows annualized estimates of the 
pledges made by the largest developed countries 
and multilateral banks in the run up to and during 
the Paris Conference. Yet, the Paris Agreement itself 
does not contain any numbers. It simply stipulates 
that “Developed country Parties shall provide finan-
cial resources to assist developing country Parties 
with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in 
continuation of their existing obligations under the 
Convention”. 
While the figure of USD 100 billion is an important 
political signal, it is not enough to meet the challeng-
es of low-carbon development and adaptation. Thus, 
in terms of the overall volume of climate finance, 
the Paris Agreement represents stagnation and only 
partially meets developing countries’ demands for 
a clear pathway to scaled-up finance. Rather than 
providing a new and more ambitious target, the Paris 
Agreement adopts the USD 100 billion as a floor and 
leaves the decision on a new target to 2025. 
Where should climate finance come 
from?
Where should the USD 100 billion come from? 
What should count as “climate finance”? As previous 
agreements, the Paris Agreement speaks of mobiliz-
ing climate finance “from a wide variety of sources, 
instruments and channels” and notes “the significant 
role of public funds”. In practice, many developing 
countries insist that climate finance (mostly) come 
from public sources, while developed countries want 
to include both public and private flows. 
Given the vague text, consistent and transparent ac-
counting becomes crucially important. Donors have 
in the past been frequently accused of re-labelling 
regular aid as “climate finance”. For example, a heat-
ed debate arose in Paris as India challenged figures 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), arguing that climate finance 
in 2013-14 amounted to only USD 2.2 billion and not 
57 billion as an OECD study claimed. As a response, 
in Paris Parties decided to develop standardized 
modalities, procedures and guidelines “for the ac-
counting of financial resources provided and mobi-
lized through public interventions”, based on which 
developed countries will submit biennial reports on 
climate finance. 
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gle them from traditional development aid. The new 
accounting guidelines and procedures, including the 
biennial reports, will hopefully provide clarity in this 
respect. 
Moving forward from Paris 
Climate finance is and will continue to remain central 
on the climate change agenda. For developing coun-
tries to subscribe to any agreement and to implement 
mitigation and adaptation measures, financial as-
sistance is crucial. To make climate finance commit-
ments credible, we need in particular
• A formal pathway on achieving the USD 
100 billion target and further quantitative 
targets as benchmarks and points of reference. 
Although this is likely to be politically very con-
tested as donors are generally unwilling to tie their 
hands, the Nationally Determined Contributions 
(the documents in which Parties are supposed to 
pledge their planned contributions towards miti-
gation and adaptation) should also contain their 
individual climate finance pledges.
• Clear and agreed-upon definitions of what 
counts as climate finance, regardless of 
whether this finance comes from public or private 
sources. 
Public funding from developed countries will be 
insufficient to meet the real financial demand. There-
fore, it is crucial that 
• New actors get on board, including the 
private sector, developing countries and 
innovative sources of finance. 
• (Co-)funding from countries traditionally 
categorized as ‘developing’ is encouraged. 
Some already made pledges to existing funds, 
namely the Green Climate Fund, or announced 
support outside existing structures, like China’s 
South-South Climate Cooperation Fund. Finan-
cial contributions made available or mobilized 
by developing countries should be accounted for 
separately from the USD 100 billion target, which 
is a benchmark for developed-country contribu-
tions only. 
• The debate on “innovative” sources of 
finance is re-opened – including for example 
levies and taxes on international aviation and 
shipping or currency transactions. Such automatic 
contributions are more stable and predictable 
than donor commitments, and they clearly are 
“new and additional”, thus avoiding the problem 
of re-labelling other flows as climate finance and 
shifting funds away from other pressing develop-
ment needs. 
The Paris Agreement also opened possibilities for 
new actors to provide climate finance. On the one 
hand, it encourages developing countries to “provide 
or continue to provide such support voluntarily”, 
thus further softening the developed-developing 
country divide. Eight developing countries already 
pledged contributions to the Green Climate Fund, 
while China pledged USD 3.1 billion for setting up 
a South-South Climate Fund. With this new fund, 
China will provide funding to developing countries 
outside of the UNFCCC system. On the other hand, 
on the sidelines of the official negotiations, private 
providers emerged: private banks, insurers, insti-
tutional investors or other private initiatives also 
pledged funds. This is significant, as it shows that 
the expected mobilization of private financial flows is 
already starting. However, it also raises new chal-
lenges, for it is unclear how such private funds count 
towards the USD 100 billion target. 
In sum, there are some steps forward, but also some 
steps backwards: The wording “new and additional” 
has completely disappeared from the text. Similarly, 
there is no reference to “innovative” finance sources 
as new ways of mobilizing funds in a more predict-
able and sustainable way.
Where should climate finance go to? 
Just as important – and contested – as the question 
of sources is the question of distribution, in terms of 
both recipient countries and addressing adaptation 
or mitigation. The Paris Agreement reaffirms the aim 
of achieving a “balance” between funding for adapta-
tion and mitigation and calls on Parties to consider 
“country-driven strategies, and the priorities and 
needs of developing country Parties, especially those 
that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse ef-
fects of climate change and have significant capacity 
constraints”. As previous texts, it explicitly mentions 
least developed countries (LDCs) and small island 
developing states (SIDS), though not African coun-
tries. Yet beyond these broad categories there is no 
guidance on how to allocate climate finance. 
In practice, the Green Climate Fund seems to strive 
for a balance between adaptation and mitigation 
and a broad regional coverage. So far, eight projects 
have been approved: two in Latin America, three 
in Asia-Pacific and three in Africa. Four LDCs, four 
SIDS and four other developing countries are the first 
beneficiaries. Five projects address adaptation, one, 
mitigation and two, both. 
Yet, most climate finance will not flow through the 
Green Climate Fund and other multilateral funds but 
through bilateral channels. Donors can thus decide 
autonomously what to fund and where. This not only 
allows them to consider their own economic and 
political interests but also makes it more difficult to 
identify the climate-relevant projects and disentan-
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• The private sector is regarded as a key part-
ner, particularly for moving investments away 
from high-emitting technologies towards mitiga-
tion and low-carbon development. A “fossil fuel 
divestment” movement is starting among NGOs 
and institutional investors – such initiatives need 
to be discussed in the negotiations, both in terms 
of their opportunities for accelerating mitigation 
and the challenges they imply for those economies 
highly dependent on fossil fuels. 
As yet, there is no guidance on how to allocate cli-
mate finance, beyond the reference to “country-driv-
en strategies” and particularly vulnerable countries. 
• More objective criteria for guiding alloca-
tion should be discussed, while ensuring that 
flexibility is kept.
• For the case of adaptation, equity should be 
the main allocation criterion – equity not in 
terms of everybody getting an (equal) share of the 
cake, but in terms of allowing equal life and liveli-
hood opportunities for everyone. 
• For the case of mitigation, while cost-ef-
fectiveness should be a key criterion, other 
aspects need to be taken into account to 
ensure a fair distribution and a long-term strategy. 
Those countries in which reducing emissions is 
most cost-effective are frequently the emerging 
economies, which also already have a substantial 
capacity to act by themselves without external aid. 
In addition, investment in research, development 
and deployment of promising new technologies 
needs to be increased to ensure long-term cost 
reductions.
• Country ownership of the financed projects 
is key to ensure sustainability. Thus, more 
formal links between climate finance and the ex-
isting national-level plans for mitigation (Nation-
ally Appropriate Mitigation Actions and Nationally 
Determined Contributions) and for adaptation 
(National Adaptation Programmes of Action and 
National Adaptation Plans) need to be created. 
Particularly for the case of adaptation, recipient 
countries are best informed about where support 
is most necessary. There needs to be a mechanism 
that makes allocation take into account the plan-
ning tools that are already available. 
Finally, finance and support are means to an end: to 
avoid (or at least to reduce the consequences of) dan-
gerous climate change. The focus on climate finance 
and the USD 100 billion target should not divert 
attention from other, non-financial support that is at 
least as important as financial assistance, including 
technology transfer and capacity building. Mitiga-
tion and adaptation are the overarching goals of the 
climate change regime, and all means of support 
including climate finance should serve that purpose. 
Meeting political financial targets are necessary for 
achieving confidence and trust, but they will only be 
meaningful to the extent that they are used for effec-
tive mitigation and adaptation.
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